Measuring wage inequality under right censoring by Nicolau, João et al.
Measuring wage inequality under right censoring∗
Joa˜o Nicolaua, Pedro Raposob and Paulo M. M. Rodriguesc
a ISEG-Universidade de Lisboa and CEMAPRE
b Cato´lica Lisbon School of Business and Economics
c Banco de Portugal and Nova School of Business and Economics
April 28, 2020
Abstract
In this paper we investigate potential changes which may have occurred over the last two
decades in the probability mass of the right tail of the wage distribution, through the
analysis of the corresponding tail index. In specific, a conditional tail index estimator
is introduced which explicitly allows for right tail censoring (top-coding), which is a
feature of the widely used current population survey (CPS), as well as of other surveys.
Ignoring the top-coding may lead to inconsistent estimates of the tail index and to
under or over statements of inequality and of its evolution over time. Thus, having a tail
index estimator that explicitly accounts for this sample characteristic is of importance
to better understand and compute the tail index dynamics in the censored right tail
of the wage distribution. The contribution of this paper is threefold: i) we introduce
a conditional tail index estimator that explicitly handles the top-coding problem, and
evaluate its finite sample performance and compare it with competing methods; ii)
we highlight that the factor values used to adjust the top-coded wage have changed
over time and depend on the characteristics of individuals, occupations and industries,
and propose suitable values; and iii) we provide an in-depth empirical analysis of the
dynamics of the US wage distribution’s right tail using the public-use CPS database
from 1992 to 2017.
Keywords: Wage inequality, tail index, top-coding, current population survey, wage
distribution, Pareto, occupations
JEL classification: C18, C24, E24, J11, J31
∗We thank Daron Acemoglu and participants of the Workshop on New Frontiers in Statistics of Ex-
tremes and of the IXt Workshop in Time Series Econometrics for helpful comments and suggestions, and
Filipe Caires for excellent research assistance. This work was funded by Fundao para a Cincia e Tecnolo-
gia through project number UID/Multi/00491/2019, PTDC/EGE-ECO/28924/2017, UID/ECO/00124/2013,
UID/ECO/00124/2019, UID/GES/00407/2013 and Social Sciences DataLab (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-
022209), POR Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722, LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-022209), and POR Norte
(LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-022209).
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
12
85
6v
1 
 [e
co
n.E
M
]  
27
 A
pr
 20
20
1 Introduction
The sharp rise in overall wage inequality in the second half of the 20th century has become a
stylized fact (Autor (2019) and Goos et al. (2014)). Wage inequality growth in the 1980s was
followed by a slowdown in the 1990s as a result of divergent trends in the bottom and top
of the wage distribution. Both the 90/50 and 50/10 indexes grew rapidly in the early 1980s,
and although lower tail inequality virtually stopped growing after 1987 upper-tail inequality
kept rising. The deceleration in inequality growth observed in the 1990s resulted mainly
from polarization, i.e., from an abrupt stop or reversal of inequality growth in the lower-tail
coupled with a sustained secular rise of the upper-tail inequality. According to Autor et al.
(2008) between 1963 and 2005 the 90th percentile wage rose by more than 55% relatively to
the 10th percentile for both men and women.
Existing empirical evidence suggests that the rise in wage inequality is largely explained
by shifts in the supply and demand for skills (Goos and Manning (2007)), and by the erosion
of labour market institutions (e.g. unions and minimum wage) (Kalleberg (2011)). It is
documented that the increase in inequality in the 1980s was the result of a secular rise in
the demand for skill which faced an abrupt slowdown in the relative supply of high-skilled
workers (college or equivalent) in the form of lower attainment and of smaller labor-entering
cohorts which originated expanding wage differentials (Autor et al. (2008); Katz and Murphy
(1992); Card and DiNardo (2002); and Acemoglu and Autor (2011)).
The monotonic increase of inequality until the late 1980s followed by the divergent evolu-
tion in the top and lower half of the distribution is robust to different measures and samples.1
Steady growth in the upper-tail inequality can also be seen from the rising share of wages
paid to the top 10% and 1% earners (Piketty and Saez (2003)). However, literature based
on public-use CPS data has produced a less than perfect picture of the right tail of the wage
distribution because of the top-coding (Armour et al. (2016)).
The CPS wage data has historically been censored at the top (top-coded) and ignoring
this fact or not adequately handling it may result in inconsistent tail index estimates, lead to
understatements of inequality and affect the estimates of its dynamics (Feng et al. (2006)).2
In addition, top-coding has changed over time. For instance, the top-coded wage was set at
$1923 in 1997 and changed to $2884 from 1998 onward. But even during periods of constant
nominal top-coding the data may hide changes in inequality (Levy and Murnane (1992)).
While some authors have tried to address the top-coding issues by restricting the sam-
ple under analysis, the method presented in this article makes use of the complete set of
information available from the public use CPS data, for every year, in a time-consistent fash-
1The result holds for male and female samples separately, considering weekly wages of full-time workers
as well as for the March CPS samples (Autor et al. (2006)).
2Parker (1999) developed a model of wages in which wages follow a Generalized Beta Distribution of the
second kind (GB2). Bordley et al. (1995) show that GB2 exhibits better fit to US wage data than alternative
distributions. Because the authors are modelling the distribution of total wage and not its components, they
only need to know whether total wages are censored or not, and therefore do not need to be concerned with
consistency problems in categories as in Burkhauser et al. (2004).
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ion, arguably providing better estimates on the level of wage inequality than other available
measures. In specific, a conditional tail index regression specifically designed to account for
right censoring is used. The tail index (sometimes also referred to as Pareto coefficient) is an
important indicator, as it can be interpreted as an inverse measure of concentration of top
wages. The lower the value of the index the more concentrated the distribution is.
Several estimation approaches have recently been proposed which consider either non-
random or random covariates; see e.g. Ma et al. (2019) (and references therein). Our
contribution falls into the latter class and provides a tail index estimator which takes the
top-coding explicitly into consideration, providing in this way more efficient and consistent
estimates than methods currently available in the literature. The superior performance of
the new approach is illustrated, and it is shown using the public-use CPS database from
1992 to 2017 that the factor values used for the adjustment of the top-coded wages changed
over time and across the characteristics of individuals, occupations and industries; moreover
it is also shown using the new estimator that the tail index has been decreasing since 1992
suggesting increased concentration in the right tail.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: i) we introduce a conditional tail index esti-
mator that explicitly handles the top-coding problem, evaluate its finite sample performance
and compare it to competing methods; ii) we show that the factor values used for the ad-
justment of top-coded wages change over time and across the characteristics of individuals,
occupations and industries, and suitable values are proposed; and iii) we provide an in-depth
analysis of the dynamics of the US wage distribution’s right tail using the public-use CPS
database from 1992 to 2017.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodology
of analysis, the new tail index estimator and a detailed description of the computation of the
partial effects; Section 3 presents the results of an in-depth Monte Carlo analysis on the finite
sample properties of the new approach and a comparison to existing procedures; Section 4
describes and discusses the results of an empirical analysis of the right tail characteristics
of the wage distribution and wage inequality in the US using the CPS database from 1992
to 2017; and finally, in Section 5 presents the main conclusions of the paper. A technical
Appendix collects proofs of the results put forward throughout the paper.
2 Methodology
To reduce the top-coding bias, researchers interested in measuring long-term trends in wages
typically impute top-code values to create a consistent series. Until recently one of four
approaches has in general been adopted in the literature: (1) the top-coding problem is
ignored i.e., top-coded observations are dropped (see e.g. Jensen and Shore (2015)); (2) an
ad hoc adjustment of the top-coded wages is made (e.g. Lemieux (2006) multiplied top-coded
hourly wages by 1.4, and Autor et al. (2008) multiplied top-coded weekly wages by 1.5); (3)
a Pareto distribution is used to estimate wages at the top of the distribution (e.g. Bernstein
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and Mishel (1997), Piketty and Saez (2003)); and (4) cell means or rank-proximity swapped
data based on the still-censored internal CPS data is used (e.g. Larrimore et al. (2008) and
Burkhauser et al., 2008); for a discussion and shortcomings of these approaches see, inter
alia, Burkhauser et al. (2010) and Armour et al. (2016).
In a recent contribution Armour et al. (2016) proposed an alternative approach which
consists in estimating the tail index of a censored Pareto distribution. To briefly illustrate
the procedure consider first the survival function, F , of a Pareto distribution3
F (y) := P
(
Yi > y
)
=
(
y0
yi
)α
, where yi ≥ y0 > 0 and α > 0 (2.1)
and the corresponding density function, fY (y) = (αy
α
0 )/(y
α+1
i ). A large number of tail in-
dex estimation procedures is available in the literature. One widely used approach is the
conditional maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) proposed by Hill (1975),
α̂Hill :=
[
1
m
m∑
j=1
log y(j) − log y(0)
]−1
(2.2)
where m is the number of largest order statistics used in the estimation of α, y(j), j = 1, ...,m
are the largest m order statistics and y0 is the tail cut off point.
However, recognizing the limitations of this approach when the data is top-coded, Armour
et al. (2016) proposed an alternative method, which consists of an adaptation of the Hill esti-
mator taking into consideration the censoring. This approach provides an unbiased estimate
of the censored Pareto parameter, α, while using all available information. In specific, in the
case of a censored sample the outcome variable is,
ωi =
{
yi if y0 ≤ yi < yc
yc if yi ≥ yc
, (2.3)
where y0 is the tail cut off point and yc the top-coded value. Hence, the density function of
the censored Pareto distribution is,
gY (ωi) =
(
αyα0
ωα+1i
)I(y0≤ωi<yc)[(y0
yc
)α]I(ωi≥yc)
(2.4)
and the respective log-likelihood function,
logL =
m∑
i=1
gY (ωi)
=
m∑
i=1
I(y0≤ωi<yc)
(
log(α) + αlog(y0)− (α + 1)log(ωi)
)
+
3This distribution was used, for instance, by Harrison (1981) to analyse earnings by size in the UK.
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m∑
i=1
I(ωi≥yc)
(
αlog(y0)− αlog(yc)
)
. (2.5)
Consequently, the conditional MLE estimator proposed by Armour et al. (2016) computed
from (2.5) is,
αˆcHill =
n0∑m
i=1 I(y0≤yi<yc)log(yi) + nclog(yc)− (n0 + nc)log(y0)
(2.6)
where n0 is the number of individuals with wages between y0 and yc, nc is the number of
individuals with wages at or above yc, and n0 + nc = m.
2.1 The conditional tail index estimator and properties
In this paper, a new approach, also designed to overcome the top-coding bias, is proposed.
In specific, a conditional tail index estimator which explicitly takes the right censoring of the
data into account and uses covariates in the estimation process is introduced. Correctly esti-
mating this tail index is of importance as it is used, for instance, for the imputation of wages
above the top-code. Furthermore, the procedure has the additional advantage of allowing for
an in-depth analysis of the determinants that impact the tail index the strongest according
to the characteristics of individuals, occupations and industries and whether these impacts
have changed over time. The use of different scaling factors to impute wages depending on
the different categorizations of individuals has been used previously in the literature, see e.g.,
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) who allow the scaling factors to vary according to gender and
over the years.
To introduce the conditional tail index estimation approach we consider observations (Xi,
Yi), where Yi ∈ R1 is the response of interest, and Xi := (x1i, ..., xpi)′ ∈ Rp is an associated
p-dimensional vector of predictors with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In addition, let F (y|x;θ) := P [Yi ≤
y|Xi = x] be the cumulative distribution function of Yi conditional on Xi, and assume that
the corresponding survival function (under no censoring) is,
F (y|x;θ) := 1− F (y|x;θ) = y−α(x)L(y; x), (2.7)
where α(x) := exp(x′θ), θ ∈ Rp is the unknown vector of coefficients and L(y; x) is some
predictor-dependent slowly varying function, such that L(yk; x)/L(y; x) → 1 for any k > 0
as y →∞. Specifically, following Hall (1982) we characterize the slowly varying function as,
L(y; x) := c0(x) + c1(x)y−β(x) + o(y−β(x)) (2.8)
where c0(x) and c1(x) are functions in x with c0(x) > 0, β(x) > α(x) a positive function and
o(y−β(x)) is the higher-order remainder term. As a result, as y → ∞, L(y; x) → c0(x) and
L˙(y; x)→ 0, where L˙(y; x) = ∂L(y; x)/∂y.
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From (2.7), it follows that the probability density function of Yi conditional on Xi is,
f(y|x; θ) = α(x)y−α(x)−1L(y; x)− y−α(x)L˙(y; x). (2.9)
Considering (2.8) and assuming that y is sufficiently large, it follows that the density in (2.9)
can be approximated as,
f(y|x; θ) ≈ c0(x)α(x)y−α(x)−1; (2.10)
see also Wang and Tsai (2009). Thus, the conditional probability function of Yi given Xi and
Yi > y0 can be approximated as,
f(y|x; θ) ≈ α(x)(y/y0)−α(x)−1, (2.11)
where y0 is the threshold that controls the sample fraction used for estimation. Note that
(2.11) is the approximate conditional Pareto density function of an unrestricted random
variable and thus, its use when some form of censoring (such as right censoring4 in the CPS
database) is imposed on the data will originate inconsistent tail index parameter estimates.
In the censored case, rather than observing the outcome yi, as in the previous section, we
effectively observe wi as defined in (2.3). In this context, the adequately adjusted conditional
Pareto density function is,
g(ωi|xi, yc,θ) := f(ωi|xi, yc,θ)I(y0≤wi<yc) [1− F (yc|xi, yc,θ)]I(wi≥yc) (2.12)
where I(.) is the indicator function and f ( .|x) and F ( .|x) correspond to the conditional
Pareto density function and the conditional cumulative Pareto distribution function, respec-
tively.
Hence, the negative log-transformed likelihood function for the top-coded data is,
Kcn(θ; yc) :=
n∑
i=1
log g (wi|xi; yc;θ) (2.13)
where g (wi|xi; yc;θ) is as defined in (2.12), wi is given in (2.3) and yc is the censoring
threshold.
Moreover, since
log [g(ωi|xi, yc,θ)] = I(y0 ≤ wi < yc) log f(ωi|xi, yc, θ) + I(wi ≥ yc) log [1− F (yc|xi, yc, θ)]
= I{y0≤wi<yc}{logα (xi) + α (xi) log y0 − [α (xi) + 1] logwi}
+I{wi=yc}{α (xi) [log (y0)− log(yc)]}, (2.14)
if we replace α (xi) = exp (x
′
iθ) the approximate negative log-likelihood function in (2.13)
4An observation is said to be right censored at yc if the exact value of the observation is not known except
that it is greater than or equal to yc.
5
(omitting for simplicity of notation the terms not related to θ) becomes,
Kcn(θ; yc) =
n∑
i=1
I{y0≤wi<yc}
(
exp
(
x
′
iθ
)
log
(
wi
y0
)
− x′iθ
)
−
n∑
i=1
I{wi=yc} exp
(
x
′
iθ
)
log
(
y0
yc
)
. (2.15)
Hence, we see from this approximate log-likelihood function that censuring the data imposes
a penalty term, which the unrestricted estimator does not take into consideration.
To derive the limit distribution of the parameter estimators and corresponding test statis-
tics we consider, as in Wang and Tsai (2009), the following assumptions:
Assumption A:
(A1) n−10
n∑
i=1
ZniZ
′
niI (wi ≥ y0) = Σ−1/2y0 Σ̂y0Σ−1/2y0 p→ Ip, where Zni := Σ−1/2y0 xi, Ip is a p × p
identity matrix and Σ̂y0 := n
−1
0
∑
(xix
′
i)I(wi ≥ y0).
(A2) (Slowly varying function) We assume that the remainder term o(y−β(x)) satisfies
supx y
β(x)o(y−β(x))→ 0 as y →∞.
The following theorem characterizes the limit distribution of the MLE estimates of θ.
Theorem 2.1 Under Assumptions (A1) - (A2) it follows that
n−1/2Σ−1/2y0 Λ
−1/2(θ̂ − θ0) d→ N(0, Ip),
where Λ := E(e2i |xi) and ei =
 exp (x
′
iθ) log
(
wi
y0
)
− 1, for I{y0≤wi<yc}
− exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)
, for I{wi=yc}
.
Corollary 1 Under the same conditions of Theorem 2.1 as n→∞ it follows that,
Tj = n
−1/2
(
Σ
−1/2
y0,jj
)
Λ−1/2θ̂j
d→ N(0, 1). (2.16)
where Σ
−1/2
y0,jj
corresponds to the (j, j)th element of the Σ−1/2y0 matrix.
2.2 Computation of partial effects
A further important and not immediately obvious aspect of the methodology just described
relates to the computation of the partial effects of the covariates used in the conditional tail
index regression. In specific, for ease of presentation consider
F (y|x;θ) := P (Y > y|x;θ) =
(
y0
yi
)α(x)
.
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where for the sake of simplicity but with no loss of generality we consider x to be a scalar
and continuous. Thus, to measure the impact of x on α (x) and subsequently on F (y|x;θ),
consider
δ :=
F¯ (y|∆x+ x;θ)− F¯ (y|x;θ)
F¯ (y|x;θ) × 100 (2.17)
where y is an extreme value, say the (1− u) quantile, with u ∈ (0, 1), such that,
y = (1− u) 1α(x) y0. (2.18)
Hence, δ in (2.17) measures the probability’s percentage variation of an extreme value due
to a variation of x, ∆x. For example, considering u = 0.15 and ∆x = 1, if δ = 20% then
P(Y > y0) , where y0 is the 0.85 quantile, increases by 20% as a result of ∆x = 1. Therefore,
the variation of x increases the likelihood of observing extreme values by 20%.
For computational purposes, assuming that α (x) := exp (φ (x)), and φ(x) is some function
of x, we show in the appendix that
δ (u) =
[
(1− u)φ′(x)∆x − 1
]
× 100. (2.19)
For instance, in the multivariate case, φ (x) := x′β, where x is a p × 1 vector of covariates,
α (x) = exp (x′β), and the impact of xj on α(x) is,
δj (u) =
[
(1− u)βj∆x − 1
]
× 100. (2.20)
Thus, a negative (positive) coefficient increases (decreases) the likelihood of having more
extreme values, i.e. βj < 0 (βj > 0) implies δj > 0 (δj < 0) (this is also obvious from the
impact on α(x) since if α(x) decreases (increases), the right tail becomes (less) heavier).
Remark 1. If we use only a portion of the sample to estimate the model, say for example,
all observations larger than y0, then y is the quantile of order 1 − u of the conditional
distribution P (Y < y|Y > y0) , i.e. P (Y < y|Y > y0) = 1 − u. To determine the quantile
order of the unconditional distribution P (Y < y) we use the relation P (Y < y|Y > y0) =
1 − u ⇒ P (Y < y) = P (Y < y0) + (1− u)P (Y > y0) . In the empirical analysis below we
use all observations larger than the empirical quantile of 0.80 (see also Mishel et al. (2013)),
so that P (Y > y0) = 0.20 in the above formula. Hence, when u = 0.15 and u = 0.20, we are
actually analysing the 96th and 97th quantile, respectively, of the unconditional distribution.
♦
Remark 2. When the covariate considered is discrete (e.g. a dummy variable) a simple
adaptation of (2.20) leads to the following formula, which measures the impact of group d = 1
over d = 0, δ (u) :=
[
(1− u)α(x;d=1)α(x;d=0)−1 − 1
]
× 100. Given that α (x; d = 1) and α ( x; d = 0)
depend on x, we also need to provide values for x. One possible solution is to replace x by
its respective averages. ♦
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3 Monte Carlo simulation
In this section we evaluate the finite sample properties of the procedures and their perfor-
mance in imputing mean wages above the top-code.
3.1 Finite sample performance of tail index estimators
To evaluate the performance of the conditional tail index estimator introduced in the previous
section, we conduct an in-depth Monte Carlo analysis using several data generation processes
(DGPs). In specific, data is simulated from the general framework,
yi ∼ D (α (xi)) (3.1)
α (xi) = exp (β1 + β2xi) , xi ∼ U (0, 1) (3.2)
where β1 = β2 = 1 and the k100%, k ∈ (0, 1), largest observations of the empirical distribu-
tion D(.) closely follow a Pareto distribution. We consider the case of right censoring given
by the censoring threshold yc so that the sequence {yi} is not completely observed. Instead,
we observe wi = min (yi, yc).
To be more precise about the framework used to generate the data, we consider that
D(.) in (3.1) is either a Pareto or a Burr distribution5 and generate samples of size n ∈
{2500, 5000, 10000, 50000}. Moreover, we censor the sample considering yc = {qˆy0.95, qˆy0.99}
which corresponds to the 95th and 99th empirical quantile of y. For estimation of the tail
index we use the bknc largest observations, with k = 0.2 when the Pareto distribution is
considered and k = {0.05, 0.10, 0.20} for the Burr. In the case of samples generated from a
Pareto distribution we could have set k = 1, however, a lower value was considered in order
to mimic the conditions typically found in empirical analysis.
Based on the specifications described above we generated 10,000 sequences of {yi} and
{wi} of size n and use in each iteration three estimation methods:
i) The tail index regression of Wang and Tsai (2009) applied to the sequence of {yi}. We
define the resulting estimator as αˆ. This method should provide the best results since
it is applied to the original uncensored data.
ii) The censored tail index regression introduced in this paper applied to the sequence
{wi}. The resulting estimator is denoted as αˆc.
iii) The tail index regression of Wang and Tsai (2009) applied to the censored data {wi}.
The resulting tail index is defined as α˜. This approach will be useful in providing
information on the impact of neglecting the censoring on the tail index estimates.
5The cumulative Burr distribution function considered in the simulations is F (x) := 1− (1 + x−αρ) 1ρ and
the corresponding probability density function f(x) := x−1−αρ(1 + x−αρ)−1
1
ρα.
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Table 1 provides the bias and RMSEs associated with the estimates of β1 and β2 in (3.2)
computed based on the three approaches described in i), ii) and iii). The first observation
we can make is that, in general, the largest bias and RMSEs (regardless of considering β1 or
β2) result from the use of the approach described in iii), i.e., when the censoring is ignored.
On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that the difference in the bias and RMSEs
obtained from the approaches described in i) and ii) are relatively small, which suggest that
the estimation approach which accounts for the censoring produces results close to those
obtained when the sample without censoring is used for estimation as is the case in i).
Moreover, this Table also shows that the bias remains relatively stable and does not
decrease as n increases. There are however different patterns according to the values of k
and yc. For instance, in Cases 3 to 6, which use the Burr distribution as DGP, a small value
of k tends to improve the estimation results given that the tail of the Burr distribution gets
closer to the tail of a Pareto distribution.
To further evaluate the estimation performance of the three estimation approaches in i),
ii) and iii), Figure 1 plots the ratios of the RMSEs of the α estimates obtained under the
these estimations approaches. In specific, the ratios are,
Ratio 1 =
RMSE (αˆc (xi))
RMSE (αˆ (xi))
, Ratio 2 =
RMSE (α˜ (xi))
RMSE (αˆ (xi))
.
Since αˆ, obtained as described in i), is the best estimator, Ratio 1 and Ratio 2 are larger
than 1, across the different values of n. However, Ratio 1 is just slightly above 1, which means
that the censored estimator performs very well and mimics closely the behavior of the best
estimator, αˆ, although the former is based on the censored data. On the contrary, Ratio 2 is
substantially higher than 1, which means that, ignoring the censoring when estimating the
tail index produces an inconsistent estimator; see Figure 1.
The censoring threshold yc also impacts the estimation results, i.e., the lower its value,
the greater is the impact of censoring on estimation, and Ratio 2 tends to be larger (see, for
example, the results for Case 4 in Table 1 and Figure 1).
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Table 1: Bias and RMSE of estimators
Case 1: DGP Pareto (k=0.20 and yc = Qy(0.95))
αˆ (xi) αˆ
c (xi) α˜ (xi) αˆ (xi) αˆ
c (xi) α˜ (xi) αˆ (xi) αˆ
c (xi) α˜ (xi) αˆ (xi) αˆ
c (xi) α˜ (xi)
n 2500 5000 10000 50000
bias(β1) 0.0025 0.0004 0.4553 0.0011 −0.0002 0.4539 0.0004 −0.0005 0.4528 0.0001 −0.0002 0.4526
bias(β2) 0.0029 0.0024 −0.4241 0.0027 0.0034 −0.4237 0.0014 0.0020 −0.4246 0.0003 0.0007 −0.4257
RMSE(β1) 0.0775 0.0937 0.4611 0.0552 0.0660 0.4567 0.0386 0.0465 0.4542 0.0174 0.0208 0.4529
RMSE(β2) 0.1703 0.1942 0.4422 0.1208 0.1369 0.4329 0.0852 0.0963 0.4292 0.0378 0.0430 0.4267
Case 2: DGP Pareto (k=0.20 and yc = Qy(0.99))
n 2500 5000 10000 50000
bias(β1) 0.0025 −0.0012 0.1000 0.0011 −0.0010 0.0984 0.0004 −0.0005 0.0980 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0977
bias(β2) 0.0029 0.0070 −0.1202 0.0027 0.0050 −0.1202 0.0014 0.0023 −0.1219 0.0003 0.0005 −0.1229
RMSE(β1) 0.0775 0.0807 0.1258 0.0552 0.0575 0.1126 0.0386 0.0401 0.1051 0.0174 0.0182 0.0992
RMSE(β2) 0.1703 0.1745 0.2006 0.1208 0.1240 0.1659 0.0852 0.0871 0.1460 0.0378 0.0389 0.1281
Case 3: DGP Burr ρ=-2 (k=0.05 and yc = Qy(0.99))
n 2500 5000 10000 50000
bias(β1) 0.0015 −0.0118 0.3277 −0.0006 −0.0084 0.3241 −0.0025 −0.0065 0.3229 −0.0042 −0.0061 0.3210
bias(β2) 0.0388 0.0488 −0.3189 0.0186 0.0242 −0.3356 0.0134 0.0161 −0.3409 0.0073 0.0097 −0.3452
RMSE(β1) 0.1450 0.1683 0.3562 0.1021 0.1180 0.3387 0.0719 0.0821 0.3301 0.0323 0.0372 0.3224
RMSE(β2) 0.4088 0.4518 0.4549 0.2833 0.3121 0.4043 0.1991 0.2176 0.3754 0.0891 0.0976 0.3523
Case 4: DGP Burr ρ=-2 (k=0.10 and yc = Qy(0.95))
n 2500 5000 10000 50000
bias(β1) −0.0099 −0.0239 0.9137 −0.0120 −0.0258 0.9098 −0.0129 −0.0259 0.9079 −0.0137 −0.0259 0.9071
bias(β2) 0.0297 0.0380 −0.6485 0.0250 0.0402 −0.6489 0.0216 0.0372 −0.6512 0.0200 0.0371 −0.6519
RMSE(β1) 0.1055 0.1596 0.9196 0.0754 0.1129 0.9127 0.0537 0.0820 0.9094 0.0271 0.0434 0.9074
RMSE(β2) 0.2609 0.3563 0.6637 0.1835 0.2492 0.6561 0.1305 0.1773 0.6548 0.0602 0.0857 0.6527
Case 5: DGP Burr ρ=-2 (k=0.20 and yc = Qy(0.99))
n 2500 5000 10000 50000
bias(β1) −0.0364 −0.0435 0.0602 −0.0378 −0.0433 0.0586 −0.0385 −0.0428 0.0582 −0.0386 −0.0421 0.0581
bias(β2) 0.0487 0.0578 −0.0733 0.0486 0.0558 −0.0732 0.0474 0.0531 −0.0748 0.0460 0.0510 −0.0762
RMSE(β1) 0.0847 0.0909 0.0966 0.0665 0.0716 0.0798 0.0542 0.0584 0.0693 0.0422 0.0458 0.0606
RMSE(β2) 0.1737 0.1807 0.1739 0.1283 0.1342 0.1344 0.0961 0.1009 0.1089 0.0592 0.0638 0.0840
Case 6: DGP Burr ρ=-2 (k=0.20 and yc = Qy(0.95))
n 2500 5000 10000 50000
bias(β1) −0.0364 −0.0551 0.4134 −0.0378 −0.0557 0.4119 −0.0385 −0.0559 0.4108 −0.0386 −0.0553 0.4109
bias(β2) 0.0487 0.0702 −0.3813 0.0486 0.0713 −0.3808 0.0474 0.0699 −0.3817 0.0460 0.0682 −0.3831
RMSE(β1) 0.0847 0.1084 0.4196 0.0665 0.0864 0.4150 0.0542 0.0727 0.4124 0.0422 0.0591 0.4112
RMSE(β2) 0.1737 0.2040 0.4010 0.1283 0.1532 0.3908 0.0961 0.1182 0.3866 0.0592 0.0804 0.3841
Note: αˆ (xi) is the tail index regression estimate considering the complete sample of data (with no censoring); αˆ
c (xi) is the censored tail index
regression estimate; and α˜ (xi) is the uncensored tail index regression estimate computed from censored data. n corresponds to the total sample size,
k to the % of observations used for the tail index estimation and bknc is the effective number of observations used in the estimation of the tail index.
yc is the censoring value used and Qy(τ) corresponds to the τ
th quantile of y.
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Figure 1: Ratios of the tail index estimates’ RMSEs
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Note: Ratio 1 = RMSE (αˆc)/RMSE (αˆ) and Ratio 2 = RMSE (α˜)/RMSE (αˆ). Ratio 1 com-
pares the censored estimator with the best estimator αˆ, while Ratio 2 compares the estimator that
ignores the censoring with the best estimator αˆ. We report the results using the Pareto and the
Burr distributions as DGP.
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3.2 Imputing mean wages
To provide further insights on the usefulness of the procedure introduced in this paper we
provide next an analysis of the performance of the different methods for imputing mean
wages. In specific, we compare the following three methods:
i) the Pareto-imputed mean wage above the top-code yc,
τˆ1 (yc) =
αˆ1
αˆ1 − 1yc (3.3)
where αˆ1 is the tail index estimate considering an uncensored Pareto distribution as
in Section 2 (see e.g. Hill (1975) and Nicolau and Rodrigues (2019) for tail index
estimators) and yc is the top-code threshold;
ii) the imputed mean wage based on the approach suggested by Armour et al. (2016)
τˆ2 (yc) =
αˆcHill
αˆcHill − 1
yc (3.4)
where αˆcHill is a consistent estimate of the tail index parameter computed as in (2.6).
Note that τ2 (yc) := E (yi|yi > yc) ;
iii) the imputed mean wage based on the method introduced in this paper
τˆ3 (yc) =
αˆ (xi)
αˆ (xi)− 1yc (3.5)
where αˆ (xi) = exp
(
x′iθˆ
)
. Note that τ3 (yc) := E (yi|xi, yi > yc) .
The main difference between τˆ3 (yc) and the other two approaches (τˆ1 (yc) and τˆ2 (yc)) is
that in the former the particular characteristics of the individuals whose wage is above the
threshold are taken into account through xi. Interestingly, the estimator τˆ3 (yc) corresponds
to the optimal mean square predictor because τ3 (yc) is the conditional expectation of yi
given xi and yi > yc. This follows from the well known result E (yi − E (yi|xi, yi > yc))2 ≤
E (yi − g (.))2 where g (.) is any other predictor of yi given yi > yc. It turns out that τ2 (yc) is
optimal only if yi is mean-independent of xi, in which case both τ2 (yc) and τ3 (yc) coincide.
Thus, having established the superiority of τ3 (yc), it remains to be shown how much
improvement is provided by τ3 (yc) compared to τ1 (yc) and τ2 (yc) when computing the mean
wage above yc. The following Monte Carlo study tries to answer this question. Our experi-
ment is based on the following steps:
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1. Select a sample size from
n ∈ {250, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 20000} ;
2. Simulate yi, i = 1, 2, ..., n according to a conditional Pareto distribution P (α (xi))
where α (xi) = exp (1 + 2xi) and xi ∼ U (0, 1) . For each i = 1, 2, ..., n simulate α (xi)
and then the corresponding yi;
3. All observations above quantile 0.95, which corresponds to yc, are censored, but their
original values are saved for comparison purposes (these values are used to assess the
estimators’ predictive precision). The data used for estimation are {wi, i = 1, 2, ..., n}
where wi = min (yi, yc) , from which we estimate τˆ1 (yc) , τˆ2 (yc) and τˆ3 (yc) .
4. The estimators τˆ1 (yc) , τˆ2 (yc) and τˆ3 (yc) are used to predict the imputed mean value
above the threshold yc.
5. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated 2000 times and the mean square errors (MSE) of τˆ1 (yc) ,
τˆ2 (yc) and τˆ3 (yc) are computed.
Other combinations of α (xi) produce essentially the same results as long as α (xi) ≥ 1,
and for this reason we present results only for the case α (xi) = exp (1 + 2xi) (note that
E (α (xi)) = 3.7). However, α (xi) should be set so that α (xi) > 1, otherwise the conditional
and marginal expected values do not exist, and consequently none of the above estimators
will be well defined. The case 0 < α (xi) < 1 should be dealt with using other estimators,
such as, for example, the median, αˆ(xi)
√
2yc).
Figure 2 illustrates our results. The lines represent two MSE ratios, Ratio 1 := MSE (τˆ1) /MSE (τˆ3)
and Ratio 2 := MSE (τˆ2) /MSE (τˆ3), computed over different sample sizes (n = (250, 500,
1000, 2000, 5000, 10000)).
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Figure 2: MSE Ratios Computed Over Different Sample Sizes
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As can be observed from Figure 2, the τˆ3(yc) estimator introduced in this paper produces
the best results as all MSE ratios are larger than one. The gains are modest (between 1%
and 2%) when the sample size is small (n=250), but they increase steadily as the sample size
increases. Another conclusion, is that τˆ2 (Armour et al. (2016)) is better than the (naive) τˆ1
estimator that does not accommodate the censoring.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section, we use censored publicly available CPS data to evaluate how the right tail
index of the US wage distribution has changed over time and how these changes may differ
across the characteristics of individuals, occupations and industries. In specific, we show that
the new tail index estimator introduced provides very rich and detailed insights about the
right tail distribution of wages. We also assess the sensitivity of the adjustment of the top
coded wage to changes over time and across the characteristics of individuals.
4.1 Data
For the empirical analysis the March CPS files from IPUMS for the period between 1992 and
2017 are used. The wage measure is top-coded at $1923 between 1989 and 1997, and at $2884
between 1998 and 2017. The sample is restricted to workers between 16 to 64 year-old on
full-time full year basis employed during the CPS sample survey reference week (35+ hours
per week, 40+ weeks per year). Following Autor and Dorn (2013) the real weekly wage data
are weighted by the appropriate CPS weight to provide a measure of the full distribution of
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weekly wages paid.6,7
Occupations are defined as job task requirements of the US Department of Labor Dictio-
nary of Occupational Titles (DOT, 1977) and Census occupation classifications for routine,
abstract and manual task classifications (Autor and Dorn (2013)).
In Figure 3 we present the distribution of the weekly wages for 1992, 1997, 1998, 2007,
2010 and 2017. From 1992 to 2017 the concentration of wages has become more skewed to the
right. Between 1992 and 1997 the mass points around the top-code increased and with the
relaxing of the top-code in 1998 real values beyond that top-code are potentially observable.
The same phenomenon also occurs in the most recent period. In 2017 the mass point around
the current top-code used in the CPS data is much larger.
6Wages are converted to 2012 values using the GDP personal consumption expenditure deflator.
7Workers in our sample come from outgoing rotation groups 4 and 8 and according to Unicon: When
the Outgoing Rotation files are produced, two rotations are extracted from each of the twelve months and
gathered into a single annual file. The weights on the file must be modified by the user before giving reliable
counts. Since the final weight is gathered from 12 months but only 2/8 rotations, the weight on the outgoing
file should be divided by 3 (12/4) before it is applied. The earner weight is gathered from 12 months from
the 2 rotations. Since those two rotations were originally weighted to give a full sample, the earner weight
must be divided by 12, not 3.
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Figure 3: Annual unconditional histograms of the weekly wage.
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The means and proportions of workers according to their characteristics, occupations and
industry, for observations above the 80th percentile, are presented in Table 2. In contrast to
1992, in 2017 the population in the right tail is older (41.03 years on average in 1992 and
43.83 years in 2017), the percentage of women is larger (25% in 1992 increased to 33% in
2017), and is about one year more educated (15.20 years of education in 1992 and 16.06 years
in 2017).
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Table 2: Characteristics of individuals: means and proportions
Year
Mean 1992 2017
Age 41.03 43.83
Female 0.25 0.33
Education 15.20 16.06
Race
White 0.90 0.83
Black 0.05 0.05
Other race 0.05 0.12
Marital Status
Married 0.83 0.81
Married no spouse 0.01 0.02
Separated 0.02 0.01
Divorced 0.09 0.09
Widowed 0.01 0.01
Single 0.14 0.16
Occupations
Managers 0.72 0.81
Administrative 0.10 0.08
Low skill 0.01 0.01
Craft 0.04 0.01
Operators 0.02 0.01
Transportation 0.11 0.08
Industrya
Agriculture 0.02 0.03
Construction 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing 0.22 0.14
Transports 0.11 0.08
Trade 0.11 0.09
Finance 0.09 0.10
Repair 0.04 0.10
Personal 0.28 0.32
Public 0.08 0.09
Observations 112,960 64,002
Observations above Percentile 80 22,485 12,791
a In Appendix C we provide a detailed description of the industry classification.
Notes: This Table reports the means for the variables used in the analysis for both
1992 and 2017. These statistics were calculated for the right tail (for observations above
percentile 80). All variables are reported on a scale between 0 and 1 with the excep-
tion of age and education which are reported in years. The occupation dummies using
6 aggregate occupation groups are based on the International Standard Classification of
occupations (ISCO) as used in Autor and Dorn (2013). The category Managers includes
management, professional, technical, financial sales and public security occupations. The
category Administrative consists of routine non cognitive occupations and includes admin-
istrative support and retail sales occupations. The category Low-skill includes low-skill
services, such as cleaning, guard, food, health, janitors, beauty, recreation, working with
children and other personal low-skill services. The category Craft aggregates precision
production and craft occupations. The category Operators refers to machine operators,
assemblers and inspectors. Finally, the category Transportation includes transportation,
construction, mechanics, mining and agricultural occupations.
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The results in Table 2 show that the 7% decrease of white individuals in the right tail in
2017 when compared to 1992 seems to be compensated by a 7% increase of individuals from
other races (non-white nor non-black). There is a 3% change in the composition of the sample,
where the reduction of married individuals is compensated by an increase in individuals that
are single. However, married still represent the marital status of the majority of individuals
in the right tail (83% in 1992 and 81% in 2017).
A further observation that can be made from the results in Table 2 is job polarization. A
significant growth in employment in the right tail for non-routine cognitive tasks is observed
in detriment of routine occupations (see also Autor (2019) and Goos and Manning (2007)).
The decrease in the share of employment is even more significant for non-routine manual
tasks (individuals in occupations associated with transportation, construction and mechanics
(Transportation) decreased their share of employment in the right tail, from 11% in 1992 to
8% in 2017). The percentage of individuals in occupation Managers, which is the occupation
with the largest proportion of individuals, increased from 72% in 1992 to 81% in 2017.
In 1992, the proportion of individuals, working in manufacturing (transports) was 22%
(12%) and this proportion decreased to 14% (8%). This decrease in the share of employment
was compensated by an increase in the repair (+6% between 1992 and 2017) and finance,
personal and public industries (+6% between 1992 and 2017). Note that the industries with
the largest number of individuals in the right tail in (1992, 2017) are Personal (28%, 32%),
Manufacturing (22%, 14%), Finance (9%, 10%), Repair (4%, 10%) and Public (8%, 9%).
However, Manufacturing (22%, 14%), Transport (11%, 8%) and Trade (11%, 9%) see their
weight decrease in 2017.
To illustrate the evolution of the proportions of individuals in the different percentiles
of the overall wage distribution, Figure 4 plots the proportions in percentiles 0.05 to 0.95
considering different attributes, occupations and industries (in the appendix we present ad-
ditional plots for all other cases analysed in Table 2). From this Figure we distinguish two
patterns from 1992 to 2017: Other Race, Female, Single and Personal increase in proportion
from 1992 to 2017 across all percentiles, whereas Administration and Trade decrease across
all percentiles. The number of Black individuals seems to decrease up to around percentile
80 and increases thereafter.
Moreover, this Figure also shows that individuals that are Black, Female or Single as
well as individuals working in Administration and Trade display a downward trend over the
percentiles, whereas the number of individuals of Other Races and individuals working in
the Personal industry display a different pattern. The former is relatively constant across all
percentiles in 1992 but increases for percentiles larger than the median in 2017, and the latter
is relatively constant across all percentiles in 1992 and 2017. Interestingly, Finance shows a
different pattern when compared to all other covariates. In specific, the largest proportions
are observed at the higher percentiles (i.e. from the median onward). This pattern is very
similar across all years analysed.
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Figure 4: Proportion of individuals in different wage percentiles
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Notes: The graphs presented in this figure represent the proportion of individuals in different
categories for percentiles 0.05, 0.1, 0.15,..., 0.95, computed for the years of 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007,
2012 and 2017.
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4.2 Conditional tail index estimation results
Table 3 presents the censored and uncensored tail index regression results for 1992 and 2017.
A negative (positive) regression coefficient corresponds to a decrease (increase) in the tail
index (ceteris paribus) and hence a larger (smaller) number of extreme values may result
as a consequence of changes in the specific variable associated to such a coefficient. Before
analyzing the partial effects, as described in Section 2.2, the behavior of a tail index estimate
computed as an average of the conditional tail indexes is examined, i.e.,
αˆt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
αˆ (xt,i) , t = 1992, ..., 2017 (4.1)
where αˆ (xt,i) = exp
(
x′t,iθˆt
)
(we only report results for 1992 and 2017, however the tail index
regression estimation results from 1993 to 2016 can be obtained upon request). The tail index
estimate in (4.1), αˆt, provides an estimate of the unconditional tail index after considering
the characteristics of all individuals in the sample for each year.
The results in Table 3 show that in general, the estimates based on the method that
ignores censored data underestimate the true effects of the variables. This is especially clear
in the estimates for 2017 (e.g. female and finance). It is a consequence of the potential
inconsistency of the uncensored estimates as highlighted in the Monte Carlo section above.
However, the direction of the impact of the covariates suggested by the uncensored estimation
is consistent with the results obtained from the censored tail index regression.
Comparing 1992 and 2017 (censored estimation), we generally observed a decrease in the
estimates for 2017 (e.g. Transportation and Craft and Precision). In some cases, although
in general not statistically significant (see e.g. other races, married no spouse, widowed,
Transports and Trade), positive estimates in 1992 become negative in 2017 and vice versa.
Considering only the statistically significant covariates it can be observed that Female, Black,
Divorced, Single, Low Skill, Craft, Operators, Transportation and Public have a positive
impact leading to a reduction in the probability of individuals with these characteristics being
in the right tail, whereas Age, Education, Construction, Finance and Repair have a negative
impact, originating an increase of the probability of individuals with these characteristics
being in the right tail.
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Table 3: Uncensored and Censored Tail Index Regression Results
Uncensored Censored
1992 2017 1992 2017
Constant 2.597∗∗∗ 2.321∗∗∗ 2.723∗∗∗ 2.812∗∗∗
(0.066 ) (0.076 ) (0.075 ) (0.121 )
Age −0.011∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 )
Female 0.272∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.014 ) (0.013 ) (0.016 ) (0.022 )
Education −0.076∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.004 ) (0.004 ) (0.004 ) (0.006 )
Race
Black 0.085∗∗∗ 0.004 0.098∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.029 ) (0.034 ) (0.031 ) (0.054 )
Other race −0.023∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.031 0.015
(0.025 ) (0.016 ) (0.030 ) (0.033 )
Marital Status
Married no spouse 0.075 −0.036 0.095 −0.100
(0.063 ) (0.046 ) (0.070 ) (0.091 )
Separated 0.035 0.051 0.044 0.093
(0.042 ) (0.059 ) (0.047 ) (0.096 )
Divorced 0.018 0.066∗∗∗ 0.025 0.119∗∗∗
(0.019 ) (0.022 ) (0.022 ) (0.036 )
Widowed 0.003 −0.070 0.022 −0.083
(0.083 ) (0.052 ) (0.077 ) (0.099 )
Single 0.009 0.066∗∗∗ 0.015 0.114∗∗∗
(0.018 ) (0.018 ) (0.021 ) (0.029 )
Occupations
Administrative 0.113∗∗∗ 0.021 0.125∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.020 ) (0.022 ) (0.023 ) (0.047 )
Low Skill 0.098 0.093 0.111∗ 0.153∗
(0.064 ) (0.060 ) (0.067 ) (0.091 )
Craft 0.289∗∗∗ 0.069 0.324∗∗∗ 0.154∗
(0.033 ) (0.056 ) (0.035 ) (0.086 )
Operators 0.394∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.050 ) (0.062 ) (0.053 ) (0.090 )
Transportation 0.366∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.023 ) (0.030 ) (0.025 ) (0.045 )
Industry
Construction −0.202∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗∗
(0.039 ) (0.042 ) (0.047 ) (0.071 )
Manufacturing 0.003 −0.011 0.004 0.026
(0.028 ) (0.029 ) (0.031 ) (0.052 )
Transports 0.050∗∗∗ −0.016 0.051∗∗ −0.001
(0.021 ) (0.027 ) (0.024 ) (0.040 )
Trade 0.002 −0.052∗∗ 0.001 −0.052
(0.020 ) (0.024 ) (0.025 ) (0.043 )
Finance −0.126∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗
(0.020 ) (0.022 ) (0.026 ) (0.043 )
Repair −0.059∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗
(0.028 ) (0.022 ) (0.033 ) (0.041 )
Personal 0.125∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.060∗
(0.016 ) (0.018 ) (0.019 ) (0.033 )
Public 0.238∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.022 ) (0.024 ) (0.025 ) (0.040 )
Note: This table reports the tail index regression results for 1992 and 2017. The
first two columns present the uncensored results while the last two columns contain the
censored results. The omitted categories are white, married, working as manager and the
agriculture industry. Standard errors in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels.
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Figure 5: Uncensored and censored right tail index estimates from 1992 to 2017
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Note: This figure reports the yearly right tail index estimates computed from
both the uncensored and the censored regressions.
Figure 5 plots the tail index estimate computed as suggested in (4.1) for each year from
1992 to 2017, based on uncensored and censored tail index regression estimates. As dis-
cussed above, the uncensored approach misrepresents the true unconditional tail index, as it
ignores the top-coded wages, leading to the overestimation of the true values of αt (where
the bias/inconsistency is due to the fact that the top extreme values are simply not included
in the estimation). On the contrary, the censored estimates take the information of the indi-
viduals of the top-coded wages, although the true wages are not known, into account. Figure
5 shows that the censored estimates of αˆt have declined over the last 20 years. In other
words, this Figure shows that the probability of observing an extreme value today is higher
compared to the 90s or even in the more recent past. This finding supports the idea that
upper-tail inequality has increased since the 90s and has become more pronounced over the
last 20 years. Autor et al. (2008) observed that the 90th percentile wage rose by more than
55% relative to the 10th percentile between 1963 and 2005, which represents a significant
increase. However, our approach suggests that the increase in inequality found by Autor
et al. (2008) may be a lower bound of the true increase in inequality.
Not adequately handling the top-coding may also lead to overestimation of the tail index
in a variety of other applications (this has been recognized in e.g. the analysis of returns to
education by Hubbard (2011), and differences in gender and race by Burkhauser and Larri-
more (2009) who already use approaches to accommodate for the fact that the wage data is
top-coded). Our procedure provides additional flexibility by allowing researchers to evaluate
which determinants impact the probability of being in the right tail of the wage distribution
and which determinants do not. Thus, permits a more detailed analysis on how inequality
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has spread across industries, occupation, gender and other population characteristics.
In what follows, we focus on the (conditional) tail index regression, and especially on
the partial effects computed as discussed in section 2.2. Figure 6 groups the partial effect
estimates and rearranges them from the lowest effect to the highest. A negative (positive)
regression coefficient translates into a positive (negative) partial effect, which is associated
with an increase (decrease) in the likelihood of having more extreme values (the right tail
becomes (less) heavier).
In the discussion that follows on the partial effects of the covariates, whenever we refer
to an extreme event, we are referring to observations which are larger than the 96th quantile
(u = 0.15); see Remark 2 for details.
It is clear that industries such as Finance, Construction and Repair are the ones with
more extreme wages. The probability of observing an extreme value increased in 2017 by
4.94% for an individual working in the Finance industry. The probability of an individual
working in the public industry having a wage higher than the 96th percentile decreased in
2017 by 2.14%. The biggest increase from 1992 to 2017 was observed for individuals that are
black, married without a spouse, or widowed. Older and more educated workers continued to
have a significant probability of observing an extreme wage but there was no relevant change
between 1992 and 2017. Women observed a positive increase between 1992 and 2017, but the
impact is still towards an increase in alpha (although smaller in absolute value than in 1992),
i.e., a decrease in the probability of being in the right tail. In specific, women in 2017 have a
partial effect on the tail index of -1.26% which corresponds to a decrease in the probability
of an extreme value.
The impact in terms of occupation is very interesting. In comparison to an individual
working in a non-routine cognitive occupation (managers) all other occupations display a
positive contribution to observe an extreme value (although smaller in 2017). However, the
picture is very different across occupations. Individuals working in routine occupations such
as administrative workers reduced their presence in the right tail from 10% to 8% (see Table
2) but the probability to observe an extreme value for these occupations increased in 2017
(-2.14% in 1992 and changed to 2.00% in 2017). The contribution to the probability of
observing an extreme value for an individual working as an operator was significantly higher
in 1992 than in 2017 (the partial effect was -8.04% in 1992 and it reduced to -1.41% in 2017).
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Figure 6: Partial Effects of Variables when u=0.15
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Note: For a description of the occupations see note under Table 2.
4.3 Imputed mean wages
4.3.1 Imputing wages above the top-code
A further important contribution of the approach introduced is its use for the imputation
of mean wages above the top-code as described in Section 3.2. Some authors use values
to adjust the top-coded wage which are time-varying and differ by group. For instance,
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) provide separate Pareto estimates according to gender and by
year from 1973 to 2014 using public CPS-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG).
These authors indicate that these values increase over time and are higher for men than for
women (e.g. for 2014 the adjustment coefficient is 2.06 for men and 1.81 for women). In
contrast, our analysis is based on the March CPS (outgoing rotation groups 4 and 8), and
on the weekly wages instead of annual earnings, however, we also find evidence in favour of
changing adjustment parameters.
This renders support to the observation that imputed wages above the top-code, based
24
on a fixed value may lead to misstatement of results, given that this approach considers
wages above the top-code to be independent of time, age, gender, race and other personal
characteristics; as well as industry and occupation.
To impute wages above the top-code, we consider the estimate of E (yi| yi > yc; xi) given
by τˆ3 (xi, yc) in (3.5). However, for some individuals in the CPS database, especially those
in the highest wage groups, αˆ (xi) can be in the neighborhood of 1, or even lower than 1,
which implies that E (yi| yi > yc; xi) does not exist and, therefore, the estimate τˆ3 (xi, yc) is
inadequate. For these cases, we use the conditional median of yi given yi > yc and xi, which
is 21/αˆ(xi)yc. In specific, to accommodate all situations (i.e. low and high values of αˆ (xi)) we
propose the following estimator,
τˆ4 (xi, yc) =
{
21/αˆ(xi)yc 0 < αˆ (xi) ≤ c
αˆ(xi)
αˆ(xi)−1yc αˆ (xi) > c
. (4.2)
In the empirical application of this statistic we set c = 1.5, since using c = 1 may lead to
explosive estimates as αˆ(xi)
αˆ(xi)−1 → ∞ as αˆ (xi) → 1+. Other values of c in the neighborhood
of c = 1.5 yield basically the same results. In the application to the CPS data we observed
that for the overwhelming majority of estimates αˆ (xi) > 1.5. Thus, for most cases, the
estimate τˆ4 (xi, yc) coincides with the second branch of (4.2), which is the τˆ3 (xi, yc) estimator
in (3.3). Hence, we use τˆ4 (xi, yc) to impute wages above the top-code over all individuals of
the sample across time (see Figure 7).
Figure 7 illustrates the estimates of the imputed wages above the top-code computed
from the different approaches discussed in (3.3), (3.4) and (4.2). The τˆ2 and τˆ4 estimates are
similar. This result is expected given that for the overall analysis τˆ4 is based on the values
of αˆt computed as in (4.1), which provides an estimate of the unconditional tail index after
considering the characteristics of all individuals in the sample. However, in the case where
estimates for a particular group, occupation or industry are considered, the τˆ3 estimates will
certainly be different from the τˆ2 estimates (see next section).
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Figure 7: Prediction of Topcoded Wages
When the proportion of wages above the top-code is relatively small (as for example,
from 1992 to 2005), the difference between τˆ1, τˆ2 and τˆ4 is relatively small; however, as more
wages are located in the top-coded category (as for example, in the years following 2007),
the effect of censored data becomes stronger and the bias (underestimation) produced by the
Hill estimator more pronounced (τˆ1 (yc)).
Figure 8 illustrates the time varying nature of the factor necessary to compute the imputed
mean wages. Recall that to overcome the top-coding bias, in the literature, a constant value is
frequently used to adjust the top-coded wages. For instance, Autor and Dorn (2013) consider
a sample between 1980-2005; Acemoglu and Autor (2011), between 1973-2009; Autor et al.
(2008) from 1963 to 2005; Katz and Murphy (1992) between 1963 and 1987; Autor and Dorn
(2013) between 1950 and 2005; Lemieux (2006) from 1973 to 2003; and Beaudry, Green and
Sand (2013) from 1979 to 2011. Figure 8 shows that using a fixed value may have been
adequate for pre-1992 data, but that the adjustment factor has increased over time reaching
an overall value around 1.85 in 2017.
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Figure 8: Top-coded wage adjustment factors between 1992 and 2017
4.3.2 Imputed wages above the top-code by gender and industry
Figure 9 illustrates the difference of the imputed mean values for individuals in the Finance,
Repair, Personal and Public industries, as well as for women and women working in those
industries. The purpose of these graphs is to further highlight the importance of allowing
for different scaling factors depending on individuals characteristics and industry, but other
graphs considering other characteristics can be plotted using our approach.
The first noticeable result is that the imputed wage of individuals decreases when we
compare the wages for individuals in the Finance, Repair, Personal and Public industries.
Finance displays the largest and Public the lowest imputed wages of the four industries. With
the exception of the Public industry, women’s imputed wages are lower for the other three
industries and this observation also holds when we condition women’s imputed wages on the
industry they are in. A further interesting result is that the imputed mean wages display an
increasing trend over time in all industries, for women and for women in those industries,
which is an indication that the adjustment factors used to compute the imputed wages also
changes over time.
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Figure 9: Imputed mean wages between 1992 and 2017 by industry
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This is further highlighted in Figure 10, where the graphs show the top-coded wage
adjustment factors between 1992 and 2017, for different combinations of women working in
different industries. Womens top-coded adjustment factor is always smaller than the topcoded
adjustment factor that would be applied to males in any industry with the exception of public.
This implies that the public industry is the less heavy tailed. On top of that women working
in the public industry earn less in the right tail than women in the right tail working in other
industries.
While women working in personal and repair are not earning much more nor much less
than in other industries we find that women working in finance would need a much higher
adjustment factor. This means that this is the industry in which they have been earning
more and this result is reinforced with a clear positive trend between 1992 and 2017.
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Figure 10: Adjustment factors between 1992 and 2017 by industry to impute topcoded wages
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5 Conclusions
This paper provides three important contributions to the literature. The first corresponds to
the introduction of a conditional tail index estimator which explicitly handles the top-coding
problem and an indepth evaluation of its finite sample performance and comparison with
competing methods. The Monte Carlo simulation exercise shows that the method proposed
to estimate the tail index performs well in terms of estimation of the tail index and when
used in the imputation of wages above the top-code when the sample is censored, which is
an intrinsic feature of the public-use CPS database.
Second, evidence is provided which shows that the factor values used to adjust the top-
coded wages have changed over time and across the characteristics of individuals, occupations
and industries and an indication of suitable values is proposed. Interestingly, the empirical
results show that the upper-tail inequality has increased since the 90s and has become more
pronounced over the last 20 years.
Third, an in depth empirical analysis of the dynamics of the US wage distribution’s right
tail using the public-use CPS database from 1992 to 2017 is provided. The application of
the procedure to the CPS data reveals that individuals working in industries such as finance,
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construction and repair are the ones with the more extreme wages. Moreover, it is also
observed that the biggest increases in the probability of observing an extreme wage between
1992 and 2017 was for individuals that are black, married without a spouse, or widowed.
Older and more educated workers continued to have a significant probability of observing an
extreme wage but there was no relevant change between 1992 and 2017. Women observed a
positive increase between 1992 and 2017, but the impact is still towards an increase of alpha
(although smaller in absolute values than in 1992) i.e. a decrease in the probability of an
extreme wage. Furthermore, it is also noted that in comparison to an individual working in a
non-routine cognitive occupation (managers) all occupations observed a positive contribution
to observe an extreme value (although smaller in 2017). However, conclusions are different
across occupations.
Our analysis also showed that women working in finance (public) would need a higher
(lower) adjustment factor to impute the top-coded wages. Furthermore, we also observe that
the adjustment factor used to impute top-coded wages should be adapted over time and
across characteristics of the individuals especially when using censored data.
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Appendix A: Technical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
For the proof of Theorem 2.1, let us show first that Σ
−1/2
y0
K˙c(θ,yc)
n
p−→ 0. Consider that
the sequence {(yi,xi)} is independently distributed.
Σ−1/2y0 K˙ (θ, yc) =
n∑
t=1
{
I{y0≤wi<yc}
[
exp (x′iθ) log
(
wi
y0
)
− 1
]
−I{wi=yc} exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)}
Σ−1/2y0 xi
=
n∑
t=1
eiZni
where
ei =
 exp (x
′
iθ) log
(
wi
y0
)
− 1, for I{y0≤wi<yc}
− exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)
, for I{wi=yc}
(A.1)
Thus, considering (A.1) we cans how that,
E (ei|xi) =
∫ yc
y0
(
exp (x′iθ) log
(
y
y0
)
− 1
)
f (y|xi; θ) dw − exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)
P
(
I{wi=yc}
)
=
∫ yc
y0
(
exp (x′iθ) log
(
y
y0
)
− 1
)
f (y|x; θ) dw − exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)
(1− F (yc|xi; θ))
=
(
y0
yc
)exp(x′iθ)
exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)
− exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)(
y0
yc
)exp(x′iθ)
= 0
Moreover, it follows that
E
(
e2i
∣∣xi) = ∫ yc
y0
(
exp (x′iθ) log
(
y
y0
)
− 1
)
f (y|xi; θ) dw − exp (x′iθ) log
(
y0
yc
)
P
(
I{wi=yc}
)
= 1−
(
y0
yc
)exp(x′iθ)
:= Λ.
From Chebychev’s weak law of law of large numbers, we have that
Σ−1/2y0
K˙c (θ, yc)
n
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
eiZni
p−→ E (eiZni)
and E (eiZni) is zero since
E (eiZni) = E (E (eiZni|Zni)) = E (E (ei|Zni) Zni) = 0
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Given these results, considering that θˆ minimizes the log-likelihood function, K
c(θ,yc)
n
such
that K˙
c(θ,yc)
n
= 0, using the Mean Value Theorem it follows that
K˙c (θ, yc)
n
=
K˙c (θ0, yc)
n
+
K¨c (θ1, yc)
n
(
θˆ − θ0
)
(A.2)
for some θ1 ∈ [θˆ,θ0]. 
A.2 Computation of the partial effects
We have
δ =
F¯ (y|∆x+ x)− F¯ (y|x)
F¯ (y|x) × 100
=
(
y
y0
)α(∆x+x)
−
(
y
y0
)α(x)
(
y
y0
)α(x) × 100
=
[(
y
y0
)α(∆x+x)−α(x)
− 1
]
× 100 (A.3)
since y = (1− u) 1α(x)y0 thus it follows that,
δ =
(
(1− u)α(∆x+x)α(x) −1 − 1
)
× 100. (A.4)
Now and given the specification α (x) = exp (φ (x)) where φ (x) is usually of type φ (x) =
x′β it follows that,
α (∆x+ x) ' α (x) + dα (x)
dx
∆x = α (x) + φ′ (x) exp (φ (x)) ∆x.
Therefore
α (∆x+ x)
α (x)
=
α (x) + φ′ (x) exp (φ (x)) ∆x
α (x)
= 1 + φ′ (x) ∆x.
In conclusion
δ =
F¯ (y|∆x+ x)− F¯ (y|x)
F¯ (y|x) × 100 =
(
(1− u)φ′(x)∆x − 1
)
× 100.

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Appendix B: Additional figures on proportion of indi-
viduals, according to characteristics, oc-
cupation and industry
Figure B.1: Marital Status
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Figure B.2: Occupation
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Figure B.3: Industry
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Appendix C: Industry classification
Table C.1 - Industry classification
Agriculture agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, mining and utilities;
Construction only construction;
Manufacturing manufacturing of non-durable and durable goods and wood;
Transports transportation, warehousing, utilities electric light;
Trade wholesale and retail trade;
Finance finance and insurance;
Repair business and repair;
Personal personal services, entertainment and recreation, professional and re-
lated services;
Public public administration and armed forces.
Note: This classification is based on the harmonized variable ”ind1990” from IPUMS.
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